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Abstract 
 The return of large government budget deficits should encourage us to resume analysis of their 
effects.  Two topics deserving further attention are the importance of correctly modeling the form of 
intergenerational relationships and clarification of the extent to which deficits crowd out private 
investment.  
 This paper presents an overlapping generations model in which children seek to manipulate the 
size of the end-of-life bequest they receive from the parent – similar to the manipulation observed in the 
Samaritan’s dilemma.  I first use numerical simulations to show this intergenerational strategic behavior 
does not negate the debt neutrality assertions of Ricardian equivalence.  
 Then, by introducing capital gains and inheritance taxes, I show the crowding out effect of 
government debt is notably smaller in models with strategic behavior; manipulation by children increases 
the importance of bequests, which forces parents to save (and bequeath) a larger portion of a debt-
financed tax cut.  In spite of the neutrality of debt under lump sum taxes, including intergenerational 
strategic behavior can significantly influence the outcome of government tax policies.  Given the 
restrictive nature of the conditions required for Ricardian equivalence to hold, it may be more useful to 
measure how near to or far from Ricardian equivalence a particular policy or economy comes rather than 
simply determining whether or not it holds in that environment.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Interest in the effects of government budget deficits waned in the late 1990’s as deficits in many 
countries substantially declined.1  There is adequate empirical evidence that government debt has 
real effects (i.e., is not neutral,) and an assortment of suspected causes, but little agreement on 
the specific cause(s) of the failure of debt neutrality or, perhaps more importantly, on the 
significance of its failure.2  The recent resurgence of significant fiscal deficits in many countries 
should motivate additional work on this topic.3  
 
Previous research indicates a sizeable portion of wealth is accumulated out of a desire to leave 
intergenerational bequests; less clear is the exact motive for these bequests.4  The impact of 
government deficits likely depends strongly on the exact nature of intergenerational 
relationships, a fact highlighted in Cremer and Pestieau (2003) and Kaplow (2001).  I employ a 
little-studied version of intergenerational relationships to show that the effects of some fiscal 
policies can be quite sensitive to the nature of these relationships while other policies are neutral.  
Specifically, deficit financing is neutral when taxes are lump sum, but the introduction of capital 
gains and inheritance taxes reveals crowding out to be significantly smaller in versions of the 
model with strategic behavior than in one without strategic behavior.  This suggests further work 
will be necessary to clarify the exact nature of intrafamily linkages in order to fully understand 
the impact of various fiscal policies.  
 
Previous works present mixed results on the significance of intergenerational strategic behavior 
in determining the effect of fiscal policy changes.  For example, Bruce and Waldman (1990) and 
Kotlikoff, Razin, and Rosenthal (1990) conclude government debt is not neutral in their 
respective static environments.  Also, Seater (1993) writes that when strategic behavior is 
included in parent-child interactions “a debt-for-tax swap alters the threat point of the parents 
and/or the children and therefore has real effects, negating Ricardian equivalence.” (p. 148).  On 
the other hand, Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) conclude debt is neutral regardless of the nature of 
the intrafamily relationships.  Seater, in his review of the Ricardian equivalence literature, finds 
only a handful of authors who attempt to make any connection between strategic behavior and 
Ricardian equivalence.  One result of this paper is to demonstrate the intergenerational strategic 
behavior, by itself, does not necessarily cause Ricardian equivalence to fail.  
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 General equilibrium analyses that include strategic behavior generally focus on other issues and 
don’t evaluate Ricardian equivalence.  The few exceptions include Nishiyama (2002), Gale and 
Perozek (2001), Smetters (1999), and Bernheim and Bagwell (1988).  The model used by 
Nishiyama is similar to one of the model specifications used in this paper, but the analysis 
simply compares macro aggregates before and after a policy change (e.g., a ten percent tax cut).  
The analysis of Gale and Perozek employs the form of intergenerational strategic behavior 
studied here, but only does so in a partial-equilibrium framework.  Smetters uses a general 
equilibrium framework to demonstrate the neutrality of some types of strategic behavior, but 
omits discussion of the form studied in this paper.  Bernheim and Bagwell extend Barro’s 
dynastic framework to extremes by asserting everyone is in fact connected through possible 
future marriages and through transfers to siblings, cousins, and charities (fn. 23).  Their result 
that “everything is neutral” is certainly untenable (as they point out) and may stem in part from 
their assertion that uncertainty about potential future connections is irrelevant.  However, the fact 
that government debt can be neutral under ideal circumstances tells us little about its effects 
under more common, distortionary, tax systems.  This paper employs a specific type of 
intergenerational strategic behavior in order to assess its role in determining the effect of 
different fiscal policies.  Specifically, I examine 1) whether Ricardian equivalence holds, and 2) 
the extent to which government debt ‘crowds out’ private investment when fiscal policy employs 
distortionary taxes.5  
 
I model the interaction between an altruistic parent and a selfish child as a form of the 
Samaritan’s dilemma.  An altruistic parent makes an end-of-life transfer to a selfish child.6  The 
child can attempt to elicit as large a transfer as possible from the parent by overconsuming when 
young, so as to be relatively poor when the parent is choosing the bequest amount.7  The parent 
faces the problem of the good Samaritan: how to help the selfish individual without 
compromising his own consumption too much.  Since successful manipulation by the child alters 
the margins at which decisions are made, the parent saves and transfers different amounts than he 
would without the strategic behavior.  Consider the effect of a subsequent government 
substitution of debt for taxes in this environment.  It seems unlikely the parent increases his 
transfer by the amount of a tax decrease when confronted with a manipulative child, causing 
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Ricardian equivalence to fail.  I show that, in spite of the altered decision margins, Ricardian 
equivalence continues to hold in this framework.  The intuition for this result relies on a revealed 
preference argument: In both cases the parent effectively controls allocation of the family’s 
resources.  The optimal allocation before a tax cut will still be optimal after the tax cut.  
 
I examine three distinct specifications of this model.  These specifications differ with respect to 
the timing of choices by parent and child within the model.  Two specifications are considered 
manipulative since a parent conditions his bequest choice on his child’s actions.  A third 
specification is considered non-manipulative since a bequest amount is chosen at the beginning 
of an individual’s life and is therefore independent of the child’s actions.  Results are obtained 
via computer simulation for each specification.  
 
While incorporating intergenerational strategic behavior may not negate Ricardian equivalence, 
this tells us little (as noted above) about the effects of including strategic behavior under more 
realistic tax systems.  Some authors suggest Ricardian equivalence may be most useful as a 
reference point – that we should measure how near to or far from Ricardian equivalence a 
particular policy or economy comes – rather than simply determining whether or not it holds.8  
The simulations offer us the opportunity to examine the extent to which government debt crowds 
out private investment when taxes are distortionary.9  I next introduce several different 
combinations of inheritance, capital gains, and lump sum taxes and perform a series of Monte 
Carlo runs by varying the model parameters.  I construct a measure of debt neutrality and assess 
the degree to which public debt reduces private investment in a variety of contexts.  Appendix A 
offers an approximate calibration to the U.S. economy.  
 
In all cases I find crowding out to be a significant concern.  However, the portion of private 
investment crowded out by public debt is substantially smaller when strategic behavior is present 
than when it is absent.  The cause of this difference is the fact that the strategic behavior leads 
families to place a greater importance on bequests than occurs when strategic behavior is absent.  
Therefore, saving by parents, particularly later in life, is also much more important when 
strategic behavior is present.  This greater importance of saving in strategic model specifications 
causes consumers to save more of the proceeds of a debt-financed tax cut, thus producing smaller 
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decreases in private investment (i.e., less crowding out), than occurs in the model specification 
without strategic behavior.  
 
One of the important issues in this analysis, understanding the effects of changing inheritance 
and capital gains tax rates, is a topic of considerable current interest.  One theory observes that 
parents who want to bequeath a specific amount to children will need to save more when the 
inheritance tax rate rises.  If true, then reducing the inheritance tax rate should cause aggregate 
saving to decline.  A competing theory holds that taxing bequests increases the cost of giving 
bequests, which leads people to shift resources away from giving bequests and away from saving 
for them.  In this case, reducing the inheritance tax rate should cause aggregate saving to 
increase.  Which of these theories holds in practice depends substantially on the precise motive 
for giving bequests, but remains an open question in economics.10  The movement to reduce 
estate taxes in the U.S. will likely provide clearer evidence on this issue in the future.  Cremer 
and Pestieau (2003) and Gale and Slemrod (2000) offer additional discussion of the relevant 
issues here. 
 
In the dynastic model employed here, with altruism as the motive for bequests, it is expected that 
lower inheritance tax rates will increase bequests and aggregate saving.11  This is consistent with, 
for example, the theoretical findings of Lainter (2001) and the empirical findings of Kopczuk 
and Slemrod (2001).  Kopczuk and Slemrod also discuss the theoretical justifications for their 
result, examining the substitution and income effects at work when a government imposes an 
inheritance tax. 
 
2.  THE MODEL  
The basic framework is a standard dynastic model with overlapping generations of three-period 
lived consumers.  The use of three-period lived consumers provides both members of adjacent 
generations the opportunity to behave strategically.  Only when the individuals can each make 
decisions in both of two overlapping periods can they make potentially manipulative choices in 
one period while still having a subsequent period of interaction.  Consumers are homogeneous 
and there is no aggregate or individual uncertainty.  Individuals are intertemporally linked by 
one-sided intergenerational altruism (parent to child).  Each consumer has one child, born at the 
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beginning of the parent’s second period of life.  In the third period of life a parent may transfer 
any nonnegative amount of resources to his child.12  
 
The government finances production of a public good by levying taxes, issuing debt, or both.  (I 
begin with only lump sum taxes in order to test Ricardian equivalence.  Later, when examining 
crowding out, I add capital and inheritance taxes as well.)  The amount of the public good and 
the financing method are exogenously specified.  The public good enters consumers’ utility 
function in an additively separable manner.  
 
The economy has the following additional characteristics:  
• A large finite number (N) of identical consumers is born at each time period.  
• Each consumer is endowed with one unit of time in each period of life. This time is 
inelastically supplied as labor.  
• A consumer born at time  may save (or borrow) an amount  at age j (j = 1,2).  The net 
return on saving (cost of borrowing) initiated at time t is 
t tja
1tr+ . A consumer is not allowed 
to borrow against a possible future bequest he may receive, but may borrow against 
future wage income.  
• The government collects per capita lump-sum taxes ( tτ ), produces a public good ( tx ), 
and can issue debt ( ) in each period t.  The government must eventually retire any debt 
it issues.  
tD
• The aggregate capital stock is the sum of private and public saving. That is,  
 1 21 2
t t
tK Na Na D
− −
t= + − .
tρ
)
 (1) 
• Consumers born at time t have preferences over their own consumption, their child’s 
utility ( ), and the public good as follows:  1tU +
  (2) 2 11 2 1 3 2([ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )])
t t t t
t t tU u c v x u c v x u c v x Uβ β ++ +≡ + + + + + +
where  is the age j consumption of a consumer born at time .  ( 1 2 3tjc j = , , t (0 1]β ∈ ,  is 
the intertemporal discount factor. 0ρ ≥  is the intergenerational discount rate.13  Assume 
 is strictly increasing and concave, ( )u ⋅ 0lim ( )c u c→ ′ = ∞  and ( )v ⋅  is increasing.  
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• A single representative firm produces all goods for the economy according to the 
aggregate production function  
 ( )t tY F K Lt= ,  
where  is aggregate labor supplied at time t.  F is strictly increasing and concave with 
respect to both arguments.  
tL
• Prices  and  are given by the time t marginal products of capital and labor 
respectively.  
tr tw
 
2.1.  MANIPULATION IN AN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL  
The main issue here is specification of when the transfer amount is chosen.  Two possibilities 
exist:  
1. The parent chooses a bequest amount at the beginning of his life and is unable to deviate 
from that choice.14  
2. The parent chooses the bequest amount in the final period of his lifetime.  
 
To date, researchers using an overlapping generations model have consistently chosen some 
form of the first approach.  We refer to this approach as one of ‘precommitment’ (to the future 
bequest amount) or as non-manipulative.  The bequest amount is chosen during the parent’s first 
period of life and cannot later be changed.  While easier to compute, this approach introduces 
time consistency problems on the part of the parent.  For example, a parent may wish to provide 
additional resources to a child who squandered resources when young or to give less to a child 
who saved a large amount when young, but is constrained from doing so.15  The unrealistic 
nature of this restriction, combined with the time consistency problem, makes precommitment a 
difficult assumption to defend in practice.16  
 
In the second approach the child’s first period actions may influence the size of the bequest she 
receives.  This gives both individuals the opportunity to behave strategically and is the primary 
focus of this paper.  The strategy available to the child is to overconsume when young, in 
contrast to smoothing consumption over her lifetime.  Later, when the parent is ready to choose a 
bequest amount, the child presents herself as a relatively poor individual and asks for a larger 
bequest.  The child’s ability to successfully manipulate the parent depends on the parent’s 
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affinity for the child and on both individuals’ wealth and income levels.  The child’s interest in 
being manipulative depends primarily on her substitution rate between current and future 
consumption.  
 
The parent may anticipate the potential for manipulation by his child.  By slightly decreasing his 
second-period savings amount (which will still be much greater than the amount saved under 
precommitment) he can reduce the assets available to him when elderly.  This diminishes the 
child’s ability to elicit a larger bequest from the parent.  The parent’s success in mitigating the 
child’s potential manipulation depends in part on the timing of their decisions within a period.  
One possibility is simultaneous choices of consumption, savings and bequests by all consumers 
alive in a period.  A second possibility is sequential choices by the consumers alive in a period: 
oldest to youngest.17  When the parent chooses his consumption and savings amounts first he is 
more successful at reducing the effect of the child’s manipulation than he is when their choices 
are simultaneous.  
 
I consider both of these specifications because it is not at all clear one is preferable to the other.  
The simultaneous choices approach is certainly more common but, as O’Connell and Zeldes 
(1993) points out, “In reality, of course, parents are born before children and make a large 
fraction of their consumption decisions before their children become independent adults.  A more 
natural modeling approach would therefore be to make parents the ‘leaders’ in a sequential 
game.”(p.364)  Consideration of both specifications also helps demonstrate the robustness of the 
Ricardian equivalence and smaller crowding out results.  
 
2.2.  SIMULTANEOUS CHOICES  
This section describes the model specification arising from the assumption of simultaneous 
consumption, savings, and bequest choices by the individuals alive in a period.  
 
The standard way to analyze a representative-consumer economy with overlapping generations is 
to write out the consumer’s objective function and all relevant constraints, differentiate with 
respect to all decision variables and construct the first-order conditions that govern the 
consumer’s choices.  One can readily take this traditional approach when a consumer’s choices 
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are independent of choices yet to be made by other individuals.  This occurs when individuals 
can commit to an end-of-life bequest amount at the beginning of their life; that is, when the 
bequest amount depends only on the consumer’s resources and his affinity for his child.  
However, the problem is more complicated when the choice of a bequest amount is dependent on 
choices yet to be made by other individuals – specifically, his child’s first-period consumption 
(versus savings) choice.  In this case the consumer must wait until the final period of his life 
(after the child’s first period) to choose a bequest amount.  Therefore, in describing the choices a 
consumer makes in this economy I begin with the problem facing a consumer in his last period 
of life and proceed using backwards induction.  
 
The problem facing an elderly consumer (presented analytically below) requires analyzing the 
trade-off he experiences between using his resources for current consumption versus giving them 
to his child as a bequest.  The fewer resources held by the child at this time, the greater will be 
the parent’s bequest.  The first order conditions governing this decision can be combined to form 
“decision rules” that specify how the elderly consumer should allocate his resources between 
consumption and bequest as a function of the resources he holds and of the resources his child 
holds.  Working backwards, these decision rules will be used by the parent when making 
decisions in the preceding period (when middle-aged) about how many resources should be 
carried into the last period of life versus consumed in middle age.  Similarly, the child will use 
knowledge of the decision rule governing the amount of bequest she will receive when making 
decisions in the preceding period (when young) about how much to consume or save that period.  
 
The process continues by next considering the problem facing a middle-aged consumer. He faces 
a trade-off between current consumption versus saving for his elderly period. Saving more will 
allow him to consume more when elderly as well as allow him to give a larger bequest. The 
presence of strategic behavior means that the more he saves, the more his child will seek to 
obtain from him, thus providing a potential drawback to saving. Fortunately the “bequest rule,” 
determined from analysis of the problem facing an elderly consumer, embodies all these 
considerations. Again, combining the consumer’s first order conditions allows formulation of 
additional decision rules that govern middle-aged allocation of resources between current 
consumption and savings as functions of his savings decision when young and the bequest he 
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receives. He will use knowledge of these rules when making decisions in the preceding period 
(when young) about how much to consume or save that period.  
 
The backwards induction process concludes with analysis of the trade-off between current 
consumption versus saving that confronts a young consumer.  Fortunately, the previously 
developed decision rules make clear how increasing savings will provide him more of his own 
resources in the future, but will lead to him receiving a lower bequest.  Combining knowledge of 
these rules with his current-period budget constraint will allow him to choose the optimal 
consumption and savings amounts when young.  
 
Perhaps this problem could be written down in a traditional manner, but doing so would require 
finding some way to capture the dependence of a consumer’s bequest amount on his future 
child’s first period consumption versus savings choice.  We could certainly write the consumer’s 
third period budget constraint as , where  is the child’s first-
period savings amount.  However, since the child won’t choose this amount until the second 
period of the parent’s life, it isn’t possible for the parent to solve this problem at the beginning of 
his life.  Thus the backwards induction approach seems the most practical.  
1
3 1 1( ) (1 )
t t t
t tc B a w r a
+
++ = + + 2t 11ta +
 
To better illustrate the interactions between members of different generations, in the descriptions 
below I take the perspective of examining the decisions by the three consumers alive within a 
particular period rather than tracking a single consumer across three time periods.  The only real 
difference lies in the time superscripts. The resulting equilibrium is a type of Nash equilibrium.  
 
Since the amount of the public good is exogenously specified and enters the utility function in an 
additively separable manner it has no effect on the consumption decisions of consumers.  
Therefore, for expositional clarity, I omit it from the descriptions below.  
 
2.2.1.  An Elderly Consumer 
The consumer who is elderly at time t (born at time t – 2) chooses consumption, 23
tc − , and a 
bequest, 2tB − , to maximize his utility from current consumption plus the discounted utility of his 
currently middle-aged child.  Thus he solves  
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2 2
3
2 2 1 2 1
3 2 3max [ ( ) [( ( ) ( )) ]t t
t t t
B c
u c u c u c Uβ ρ β β ρ
− −
− − −
,
+ + + ]t
t
 
subject to the budget constraint facing an elderly consumer:18  
 2 2 23 2 (1 )
t t t
t tc B w a r τ− − −+ = + + − ,
t
 (3) 
 
the budget constraint currently facing his child:  
 1 1 1 22 2 1 (1 )
t t t t
t tc a w a r B τ− − − −+ = + + + −  
and   2 23 0
t tc B− −, ≥   
where  and 22 1
t t
t tr w a a
− −, , , 1 tτ  are taken as given.  Also taken as given are the decision rules 
governing young and middle-aged consumer choices.  
 
The primary concern of an elderly consumer is the trade-off between his own current 
consumption ( ) and the impact his bequest will have on his child’s current consumption 
( ) and savings (
2
3
tc −
1
2
tc − 12
ta − ).  He knows the child faces a similar trade-off between his current 
consumption and savings.  He also knows the child will use savings from this period to 
maximize utility next period.  Assuming the child will act rationally in maximizing his utility 
means (by application of the envelope theorem) the child’s current savings choice implicitly 
maximizes his current and future utility.  Thus an elderly consumer need not explicitly 
incorporate his child’s future decisions into his current maximization problem.  
 
The elderly consumer’s first order conditions can be combined to give  
 1 22 3( ) ( ) 0
t tu c u cρ β− −′ ′− = .  (4) 
 
Substituting in the respective budget constraints allows equation (4) to provide a specification of 
the parent’s bequest as a function of the parent’s second period savings amount and his child’s 
first period savings amount.  That is,19  
 2 22 1(
t t tB B a a− − 1)−≡ , .  (5) 
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The child considers this bequest function when young while attempting to manipulate the size of 
her parent’s bequest through her choice of consuming 11(
tc − ) versus saving ( ).  11
ta −
 
2.2.2.  A Middle-Aged Consumer  
A consumer who is middle-aged at time t (born at time t–1) chooses consumption, 12
tc − , and 
savings, , to maximize his utility from present and future consumption plus the discounted 
utility ( ) of his currently young child. Thus he solves the following problem:  
1
2
ta −
tU
  
1 1
2 2
1 2 1
2 3max [( ( ) ( )) ]t t
t t
a c
u c u c Uβ β ρ
− −
− −
,
+ + t
t
 
subject to the budget constraint facing a middle-aged consumer:  
 1 1 1 22 2 1 (1 )
t t t t
t tc a w a r B τ− − − −+ = + + + − ,
1t
 (6) 
 
the budget constraint he will face next period:  
 1 1 13 1 2 1(1 ) ,
t t t
t tc B w a r τ− − −+ + ++ = + + −  (7) 
 
his child’s current budget constraint:  
1 1
t t
t tc a w τ+ = −  
and     12 0
tc − ≥
where  and 1 21 1 1 1
t t t t
t t t t tr w a B a c w rτ− − + +, , , , , , , , 1 1tτ +  are taken as given.  Also taken as given are the 
decision rules governing young and elderly consumer choices.  
 
Note that choosing  implicitly specifies 12
ta − 1tB −  (from equation (5), taking  as given).  Then 
equation (7) specifies  as a function of 
1
ta
1
3
tc − 12
ta − .  Assuming the child acts rationally, as will her 
child, etc., to maximize utility means (by application of the envelope theorem) the parent’s 
current savings choice will be utility maximizing for all future generations as well as being 
optimal for him today.  Thus a middle-aged consumer need not explicitly incorporate his child’s 
future decisions into his current maximization problem.  
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We again combine the resulting first order conditions to develop implicit functions for 12
ta −  and 
 as functions of , 12
tc − 11
ta − 2tB −  and .1
ta 20  The currently middle-aged consumer employed these 
functions when young (at time t – 1) to inform his choice of 11
ta −  and the current elderly 
consumer uses these functions to inform his choice of 2tB − .  Also, the current young consumer 
uses awareness of these functions when choosing her current consumption and savings amounts.  
 
2.2.3.  A Young Consumer  
A consumer who is young at time t chooses consumption,  and savings, , to maximize her 
utility from present and future consumption plus the discounted utility of her as-yet-unborn child.  
Thus she solves the following problem:  
1
tc 1
ta
 
1 1
2 1
1 2 3max[ ( ) ( ) ( ) ]t t
t t t t
c a
u c u c u c Uβ β ρ +
,
+ + +  
 
subject to the young consumer’s current budget constraint:  
 1 1
t t
t tc a w τ+ = − ,
1t
 (8) 
 
the budget constraint the young consumer will face next period:  
 12 2 1 1 1(1 )
t t t t
t tc a w a r B τ−+ ++ = + + + − +  (9) 
and     1 0
tc ≥
where  (used in equation (5) for 12
t
tw a
−, 1tB − ), 1t t tw r 1τ + +, ,  and 1tτ +  are taken as given.  Also taken 
as given are the decision rules governing the choices of middle-aged and elderly consumers.  
 
The young consumer will combine her knowledge of the decision rules developed for choices 
made by middle-aged and elderly consumers with knowledge about her parent’s current savings 
( ) in order to manipulate the bequest her parent will choose next period.  With these decision 
rules in place, we can see that the young consumer’s savings choice implicitly specifies all future 
consumption and savings amounts.  Thus by using backwards induction, and developing 
behavioral rules for each period of life, we’ve reduced the consumer’s problem to one that can be 
solved in the first period of life.  
1
2
ta −
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 The young consumer’s first order conditions can be combined to show the trade-off between 
present consumption and savings:21  
 
1
1 2 1
1
( ) ( )[1 ] 0
t
t t
t t
Bu c u c r
a
β
−
+
∂′ ′− + + + =∂  (10) 
where 1 1/
t tB a−∂ ∂  is obtained from equation (5).  
 
2.3.  SEQUENTIAL CHOICES  
Uncertainty regarding the true nature of parent-child interactions, coupled with the fact that the 
sequential-choice specification produces different allocations than does the simultaneous-choice 
specification, strongly indicates we should evaluate it as well.  However, since this specification 
is structurally identical to the simultaneous-choice specification I omit a detailed description of it 
here.  
 
The primary difference between the two specifications is that here a middle-aged consumer does 
not treat the young consumer’s savings choice as given.  Analysis of the problem facing the 
young child allows us to formulate her savings choice as a function of the savings choice of 
today’s middle-aged consumer.  Recognizing the impact his savings choice will have on the 
child’s savings choice increases the parent’s ability to reduce the child’s potential manipulative 
behavior.  
 
3.  COMPUTER SIMULATION  
The specific functional forms used in the simulations are as follows.  
• Utility of Consumption is given by  
 ( ) ( ) cu c v x x
γ
γ+ = +  (11) 
with 1γ < , 0γ ≠ .  
• Production Function is given by:  
 (1 )( )t t t tF K L AK L
α α−, =  (12) 
where  is aggregate labor supplied at time t and tL 0 1α< < .  
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• Prices are given by their respective marginal products so   
(1 )( / )t t tr A L K
αα −=     and    (1 )( / )t tw A K Lt αα= −   
 
3.1.  AN EXAMPLE  
To illustrate the differences between the equilibria of the different specifications I choose a set of 
parameter values (see Table 1) and compute the equilibrium of each specification.  The values 
were chosen to be consistent with those used in other macroeconomic simulations.  For example, 
a reasonable estimate of the annual intertemporal discount rate (β) is .  Assuming each 
period in the model represents 20 years requires raising this value to the 20th power.  The values 
of A and ρ were chosen to roughly scale the model economies and the flow of bequests to those 
observed in the U.S. over the last 20 years.  Appendix A offers specific details regarding 
calibration of the different model specifications to observations of the U.S. economy.  A 
significant difference between this example and the calibration discussed in Appendix A is that 
all government policy variables were set to zero for this example.  The results are qualitatively 
insensitive to parameter variations.  
0 96.
 
Table 1: Parameters for Numerical Example 
 
α β γ ρ A 
0.3 0.442 -2.0 0.15 2.5
 
 
Table 2 compares the steady state equilibria of the three specifications.  The first column shows 
the equilibrium resulting in the non-manipulative specification.  Since individuals in this 
specification make all choices at the beginning of life, consumption is smoothed over all three 
periods.  (That is, u c 1 1'( ) (1 ) '( )j t jr u cβ + += + 1,2j, = .)  The parent chooses a bequest amount 
knowing his child will also smooth consumption over the three periods of her life.  Thus the 
amount of bequest given depends only on the parent's affinity for his child and the lifetime 
wealth of each individual.  As expected, in the non-manipulative specification, the parent gives 
the smallest bequest, first period consumption is smallest of any of the three specifications and 
second and third period consumption amounts are largest.  Utility is lower under this 
specification, for similarly sized economies, than it is under the other two specifications. 
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The second column shows the equilibrium resulting in the simultaneous-choice specification.  In 
this specification, since the return to saving is lower here than in the non-manipulative 
specification (  in equation (10)), consumers decrease first-period savings and 
increase first-period consumption.  By having fewer assets when the parent chooses a bequest 
amount, children can successfully manipulate parents into giving significantly larger bequests.  
Compared to the other specifications, this specification produces the largest first period 
consumption amount, the smallest second and third period consumption amounts and the largest 
bequest amount.  In addition, utility is the largest of any of the three specifications – primarily a 
result of shifting consumption forward in time.   
1
1 0
t tB a−∂ /∂ <
 
 
 
Table 2: Steady State Comparison Across Specifications 
 
 Non-Manipulative 
Simultaneous 
Choices 
Sequential 
Choices 
(A=2.5) 
Sequential 
Choices 
(A=2.7162) 
Period 1 
Consumption 0.7022 0.8772 0.7351 0.8276 
Period 2 
Consumption 1.0068 0.9350 0.8486 0.9554 
Period 3 
Consumption 1.4434 1.3404 1.2166 1.3697 
Period 1 Savings 0.0334 -0.1416 -0.0817 -0.0920 
Period 2 Savings 0.1335 0.3085 0.1941 0.2185 
Bequest Amount 0.1824 1.4519 1.0812 1.2173 
Total Utility -1.5046 -1.1259 -1.5273 -1.2049 
Total Output 185,458 185,458 164,735 185,458 
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The child’s decision to consume a large amount when young, and even to borrow to finance this 
consumption, increases the parent’s marginal benefit of giving a bequest.  This leads the parent 
to significantly increase his second period saving in order to finance the larger bequest.  Note 
that roughly 70 percent of second-period saving will go to bequests in this specification, 
compared to roughly 20 percent in the non-manipulative specification.  In addition, middle-aged 
individuals receive larger bequests than they did in non-manipulative specification.  This 
additional income facilitates an even greater increase in saving and also allows him to increase 
second-period consumption, almost restoring it to the amount he enjoyed without a manipulative 
child.   
 
In this specification, as in the non-manipulative specification, a middle-aged parent chooses his 
second-period savings amount taking the bequest of his elderly parent and the first-period 
savings of his child as given.  Since these quantities are the inputs to the decision rules developed 
in the preceding section, the middle-aged consumer chooses to smooth consumption over his 
second and third periods of life.  
 
Two columns are presented for the sequential-choice specification.  The first uses the same 
parameter values as are used for the other two specifications.  Note that the sequential-choice 
specification generates a lower output level than the other two specifications – the substantially 
lower second period savings produces a lower capital-labor ratio in this specification.  This 
naturally causes lower consumption, savings and bequest amounts and a lower utility level.  To 
better compare these amounts with those of the first two equilibria, multi-factor productivity is 
increased in the final column (to A = 2.7162) in order to bring total output up to the level 
observed in the first two specifications.  Comparing the amounts in the final column to those of 
the simultaneous-choice specification reveals that under sequential choices a parent is able to 
somewhat mitigate his child’s manipulation.  This is evidenced by the lower bequest amount 
than that given under simultaneous choices.  First period consumption falls slightly as first 
period savings rises.  Second and third period consumption amounts rise slightly and second 
period savings falls substantially.  The net result is a slightly lower utility level than that obtained 
in the simultaneous-choice specification.  (Note, however, that utility in the unadjusted case, 
with A = 2.5, is even lower than that obtained in the non-manipulative specification.) 
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 The parent can reduce his child’s manipulation because he now makes his second-period choices 
before the child makes her first-period choices.  By choosing first, and using the child’s first-
order condition to anticipate the savings amount the child will subsequently choose, the parent 
effectively chooses the bequest amount as well (using equation (5)).  The parent chooses a 
smaller second-period savings amount (than in the simultaneous-choice specification) so as to 
have fewer extortable assets when elderly.  The child reacts by choosing a larger first-period 
savings amount.  With the child choosing after the parent, the child’s choice will likely affect the 
amount of bequest the parent will give next period.  As a result, individuals no longer smooth 
consumption over the second and third periods of life.  
 
Comparisons to the non-manipulative specification follow the same pattern as described above 
for the simultaneous-choice specification.  Also, the ratio of savings to output in the non-
manipulative and simultaneous-choice specifications is 5.3 percent – similar to that observed in 
the U.S. over the last 20 years.  This ratio falls to approximately 4.0 percent in the sequential-
choice specification. 
 
Perhaps the most significant inference to be drawn from this example is that, when strategic 
behavior is present, overconsumption by young consumers increases their dependence on 
bequests for the resources needed to finance consumption and saving in their second and third 
periods of life.  This increased emphasis on bequests forces parents to save more in their second 
period of life and to spend a larger portion of their second-period saving on bequests.  The 
increased importance of saving and bequests noted here for strategic model specifications will 
play a significant role in later assessment of the crowding out effect of government debt. 
 
4.  TESTING RICARDIAN EQUIVALENCE WITH LUMP SUM TAXES  
Ricardian equivalence predicts that an altruistic parent will increase the size of his transfer to 
help his child (or other descendant) with their new tax burden.  Using a wide variety of 
parameter values, I examine each specification and find that the substitution of government debt 
for lump sum taxes has no real effects.  Savings and bequests increase temporarily as the 
proceeds of the tax cut are saved and passed on to future generations.  This result is independent 
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of the sequence of choices within a period and occurs in spite of the fact that altering the 
sequence of choices does change the resulting allocations.  
 
To demonstrate the robustness of this result, simulation runs were made with a large number of 
different parameter configurations.  For example, repayment of the debt was delayed several 
periods and different size deficits were considered.  The results indicate Ricardian equivalence 
holds for all specifications.  
 
As Seater (1993) observes, it is reasonable to expect Ricardian equivalence fails whenever a 
child successfully manipulates his parent’s bequest amount.  However, since this is not the result 
here we must re-evaluate our intuition.  It is tempting to conclude the result is a natural outcome 
of the view that each family is actually “one big happy family” in which the parent effectively 
determines how the family’s resources will be distributed.  This analogy fails when we realize 
that the resulting allocations are not optimal, as evidenced by the fact that individuals achieve 
higher utility when allowed to behave strategically than when not.  
 
Consider that each individual overlaps with a parent for two periods then, as the parent dies, 
becomes a parent himself and overlaps with his child for two periods, who subsequently overlaps 
with her child for two periods and so on.  This effectively produces a sequence of two-period 
parent-child interactions.  Rebelein (2002) shows that, in a static, two-period model with 
strategic behavior, shifting tax burdens from parent to child has no effect on consumption or 
savings.  The question is, what happens when we introduce perturbations to the dynamic 
environment?  Specifically, how do these perturbations propagate – do they expand or damp out?  
Given the subgame perfect nature of the equilibrium in each period small perturbations should 
damp out, rather than expand, over time.  A small perturbation is defined as one that does not 
lead to corner solutions in a period.  By construction we are studying only interior solutions so 
all perturbations are small by definition.  Thus any change in the timing of taxes should damp out 
and Ricardian equivalence will hold.  
 
More directly, Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) asserts that, when private transfers are operative, 
public transfers will be neutral when the game played between generations is strategically 
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equivalent before and after the public transfer.  Using their change-of-variable approach reveals 
that the substitution of debt for taxes produces a linear shift of the strategy space, but leaves the 
structure of the game unchanged (assuming transfers remain operative).  This suggests we should 
expect Ricardian equivalence to hold in spite of the presence of strategic behavior.  They also 
suggest their result to be independent of whether taxes are distortionary or lump sum, a 
conclusion different from that reached in the next section.22  
 
5.  DISTORTIONARY TAXES AND CROWDING OUT  
When Ricardian equivalence holds private saving will increase by the amount of debt issued and 
private investment stays constant.  When Ricardian equivalence fails private saving increases by 
some lesser amount (or may even fall) and private investment falls.  The difference between the 
increase in private saving and the amount of debt issued equals the amount of private investment 
crowded out by the debt.  
 
Given that Ricardian equivalence fails in the presence of distortionary taxes it may be useful to 
be able to gauge how close an approximation Ricardian equivalence is for a particular economy.  
The ratio of the amount of private investment crowded out to the amount of debt issued can be an 
effective measure of the impact of deficit financing on a particular economy.23  The goal of this 
section is to determine whether the presence of intergenerational strategic behavior has any 
effect on the amount of crowding out caused by the substitution of government debt for current 
taxation and, if so, to clarify the nature of that effect. 
 
5.1.  ASSESSING CROWDING OUT 
Let R be the degree to which Ricardian equivalence holds.  I define R as  
 D SR
D
∆ − ∆= ∆  (13) 
where  
 111 2(
t tS a a Na a−∆ = − + − 2)  (14) 
with ( 1 2j ja = , )  being the steady state, pre-debt savings amounts and D∆  the increase in debt.  
 
 20
The value of R indicates the fraction of the debt that crowds out private investment and thus can 
be used to measure how far from satisfying Ricardian equivalence is the economy.  When R = 0 
the increase in private saving is equal to the increase in public debt and no crowding out occurs.  
If R = 0.2 in a particular environment then twenty percent of the debt crowds out private 
investment and we would assert there is a twenty percent deviation from Ricardian equivalence 
in that environment.  The closer R is to zero the better Ricardian equivalence is as an 
approximation for that environment.  The closer R is to one, the less Ricardian is the economy – 
individuals consume most of the proceeds of the tax cut rather than increasing saving to pay for 
future tax increases and private investment falls by an amount approaching the amount of the 
debt.  Worth noting is that the decline in private investment will also negatively affect output, 
thereby further depressing aggregate saving.  
 
Most often we have 0 < R < 1, indicating consumers save only a portion of the tax cut and some 
crowding out occurs.  It is possible to have R > 1, which could occur when the decrease in 
private investment combined with the tax increase necessary to pay interest on the debt lead to a 
decline in output (and bequests) that depresses private saving below its initial level.  It is unclear 
what specific interpretation particular values of R have in these cases.  At a minimum the fact 
that R > 1 indicates Ricardian equivalence fails dramatically; clearly, the government borrowing 
leads to a reduction in output, savings, etc., in these cases. 
 
I assess the crowding out of private investment by debt when the debt is left outstanding 
indefinitely – a reasonable assumption given that governments today show little desire to repay 
the bulk of their outstanding debts.  I model this by leaving debt outstanding for a length of time 
sufficient for the economy to reach a new steady state.24  Leaving debt outstanding requires a 
small tax increase to pay the interest that accumulates each period.  This experiment simulates 
the conditions countries with significant current public debts often experience.  
 
5.2.  DISTORTIONARY TAXES 
For each specification I evaluate different combinations of lump sum, inheritance, and capital 
gains taxes.  Let Bθ  denote the tax rate on end-of-life bequests.  Let Gθ  denote the tax rate on 
capital gains.  The new budget constraints for a consumer born in period  are as follows.  t
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 For a young consumer:  
 1 1
t t
t tc a w τ+ = − .
t
 (15) 
For a middle-aged consumer:25  
 12 2 1 1 1 1 1 1(1 ) max( 0) (1 )
t t t t t
t t t G Bc a w a r a r Bθ θ τ−+ + ++ = + + − , + − − + .
2t
 (16) 
For an elderly consumer:  
 3 2 2 2 2 2(1 ) max( 0)
t t t t
t t t Gc B w a r a r θ τ+ + ++ = + + − , − + .  (17) 
The government’s period t  budget constraint is now  
 ( )2 11 1(1 ) 3 max( 0) max( 0)t t tt t t t t B G 22 tx D r N D N B N a aτ θ θ− − −−+ + = + + + , + , r .  (18) 
 
5.3.  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
To ensure generality of the results I performed a large number of runs; by varying the parameters 
of the model around the values given in Table 1, I constructed a grid of over 10,000 parameter 
combinations.26  For each combination I determine the savings amounts for the initial, pre-debt, 
steady state and for the final, with-debt, steady state.  I then calculate a value for R for each tax-
policy combination for each model specification.  The first column of Table 3 indicates the type 
of tax policy used to raise government revenues.  The subsequent columns of Table 3 report 
average R values and standard deviations for each policy for the three different model 
specifications. 
 
Most striking about the results is the significant difference between the R values obtained for the 
non-manipulative specification and those obtained for the two manipulative specifications.  In 
contrast, the R values obtained for the two manipulative specifications are quite similar.  Further, 
the standard deviations for the two manipulative specifications are consistently smaller than 
those of the non-manipulative specification.  Also, note that there are qualitative similarities 
between the R values of the different model specifications; deviations from Ricardian 
equivalence are smallest when tax revenues are raised in some part with lump sum taxes, while 
deviations from Ricardian equivalence are largest when tax revenues are raised in some part with 
inheritance taxes.27   Most of the R values are fairly large, indicating government debt crowds out 
a substantial amount of private investment when debt is left outstanding indefinitely.   
 22
  
Table 3:  Average Portion of Debt Crowded Out of Private Investment 
 
Model Specificationb
Policya
Non-Manipulative Simultaneous Choices Sequential Choices
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Lump Sum Tax (Baseline) 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
134.3% 97.9% 97.3% 
Inheritance Tax Only 
(58.0) (31.9) (35.3) 
100.4% 80.4% 79.3% 
Capital Gains Tax Only 
(21.4) (13.8) (15.7) 
60.4% 43.4% 43.0% 
50% LS + 50% IN 
(29.8) (13.7) (15.9) 
43.8% 35.3% 34.1% 
50% LS + 50% CG 
(10.3) (6.40) (7.10) 
114.5% 88.9% 88.5% 
50% IN + 50% CG 
(39.6) (23.5) (26.3) 
71.7% 54.5% 53.9% 
1/3 LS + 1/3 IN + 1/3 CG 
(27.3) (13.8) (15.9) 
 
 
 
                                                 
a LS refers to the lump sum tax; IN to the inheritance tax, and CG to the capital gains tax. 
b Values in parentheses are standard deviations. 
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To understand why less crowding occurs in the manipulative specifications than occurs in the 
non-manipulative specification it may help to examine separately the effects of a temporary tax 
rate decrease and of a sustained increase in government borrowing.28  For expositional clarity, 
the discussion below focuses on inheritance taxation; the results, however, are similar for capital 
gains taxation.29
 
In all three specifications, a one-period decline in the tax rate effectively provides individuals 
alive in that period with additional income.  Because individuals care about the well-being of 
their child, they save and bequeath some of this additional income.30  The next generation, while 
not benefiting directly from the tax cut, does receive additional income in the form of a larger 
bequest.  These individuals also save and bequeath some of their additional income.  Each 
successive generation also receives a larger bequest, and then gives a larger bequest, than they 
would have without the policy change.  Since saving is an important part of setting aside 
resources for bequests, we expect aggregate saving to increase when bequests increase.31
 
An increase in government borrowing reduces the supply of funds available for private 
investment, which causes the interest rate to increase.  The greater return to saving (higher cost 
of borrowing) causes individuals to save more (borrow less) throughout their lifetime.  Then, in 
the final period of life, with more wealth than they would have had without the interest rate 
increase, individuals divide their additional wealth between purchasing more goods and giving a 
larger bequest.  It is clear that aggregate saving will increase in this case and, since (at least) part 
of savings are used for bequests, that bequests should increase as well.  The net result, in both the 
manipulative and non-manipulative model specifications, of a temporary tax cut and a long-
lasting debt increase, is a persistent increase in aggregate saving and in bequests. 
 
How does the presence of intergenerational strategic behavior influence these changes?  It was 
noted earlier that manipulation by children forces parents to transfer, via bequests, more of their 
wealth than is required of parents with non-manipulative children.  Thus, when parents receive 
additional income, whether explicitly, as from a tax cut or a larger bequest, or implicitly, as from 
an interest rate increase, we expect manipulated parents to save and bequeath a larger portion of 
additional income relative to the portion saved and bequeathed by unmanipulated parents.  The 
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greater increase in aggregate saving in the manipulative specifications means less crowding out 
occurs in these specifications than occurs in the non-manipulative specification.  The results in 
Table 3 suggest crowding out in the manipulative specifications may be twenty to twenty-seven 
percent smaller than it is in the non-manipulative specification. 
 
Finally, even though qualitative similarities exist between the effects occurring under inheritance 
and capital gains taxes, the results in Table 3 indicate that the deviation from Ricardian 
equivalence is consistently larger under an inheritance tax than it is under a capital gains tax.  In 
other words, private saving increases more when there is a decrease in the capital gains tax rate 
than it does when there is a decrease in the inheritance tax rate.  We know that decreasing either 
tax rate should cause saving to increase.  However, a decrease in the capital gains tax rate 
directly increases the return to saving, while a decrease in the inheritance tax rate merely 
increases the return to one reason for saving: giving bequests.  Since bequests are not the only 
motive for saving, it is not surprising that the increase in aggregate saving is more substantial 
when the capital gains tax rate declines than it is when the inheritance tax rate declines.  This 
difference could be particularly noteworthy given the current policy debate in the United States 
regarding the future of the estate tax.  The values in Table 3 suggest that using government debt 
to finance reductions in inheritance taxes will be more damaging to the economy – via greater 
crowding out and the accompanying reduction in output – than would using debt to finance 
reductions in capital gains taxes. 
 
6.  CONCLUSION 
This paper has two primary goals.  First, I extend the analysis of Ricardian equivalence and the 
intergenerational “Samaritan’s dilemma” to a dynamic, general equilibrium environment by 
constructing a model with overlapping generations of three-period lived consumers.  Analyzing 
computer simulations of this model shows the temporary substitution of government debt for 
current lump sum taxes has no effect on consumption, aggregate savings, or output in this 
framework.  This result is independent of the sequence of choices undertaken within a period and 
of the specific parameter values selected.  
 
The more substantial goal of this paper is to compare the crowding out effect of government debt 
 25
in model specifications with and without intergenerational strategic behavior when taxes are 
distortionary.  The amount of crowding out is much greater in the specification without strategic 
behavior than it is in the specifications with strategic behavior.  The exact form of strategic 
behavior (simultaneous vs. sequential choices) has little impact on the results. In the 
specifications with strategic behavior the increased significance of bequests – the child’s 
overconsumption when young forces greater reliance on bequests for income later in life – means 
parents give a larger bequest than they do in the specification without strategic behavior.  Giving 
a larger bequest requires a parent to save more in the strategic specifications.  In particular, when 
offered additional current income (e.g., via a tax cut), a manipulated parent is forced to bequeath 
and save a larger portion of the new income compared to the portion bequeathed and saved by an 
unmanipulated parent.  This larger increase in saving when strategic behavior is present leads to 
a smaller amount of crowding out in these specifications.  
 
The neutrality of lump sum taxes and smaller amount of crowding out with distortionary taxes 
might suggest further studies of the effects of deficit financing need not include strategic 
behavior.  However, allowing strategic behavior does change the resulting allocations.  We also 
note that non-strategic specifications can suffer time consistency problems and will overestimate 
the amount of crowding out occurring in manipulative families.  The bottom line here is that the 
exact nature of intergenerational relationships affects the outcome of fiscal policy in a significant 
way.  Thus it seems important to intensify our efforts to determine the true nature of these 
relationships.  
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APPENDIX A 
 
A.1.  CALIBRATION TO THE U.S. ECONOMY  
 
The model is roughly calibrated to the U.S. economy as described below.  The time period for 
observation is 1985-2004, chosen for its high value of new federal debt.  (Twenty years equals 
one period in the model.)  
 
• The average U.S. population of individuals 20+ years of age between 1985 and 2004 was 
188,021 thousand.32  Assuming 1/3 of these individuals belong to each age cohort gives  
N = 62,673.7 thousand.  
 
 Total Federal Outlays were $33,034.46 billion (in chained 2000 dollars) and Transfer 
Payments were $17,802.07 billion during the period.33  The difference of $15,232.39 is 
considered to be the amount of the public good provided by the government.  Thus  
 15,232.39 1 ...,tx t= ∀ = , ∞.  
 
 The U.S. government issued $3,301.34 billion (in chained 2000 dollars) of new federal 
debt during the period.34  I assume this debt is issued in period DT  and, for simplicity, no 
debt is issued in other periods.  Thus  
 
0 1 1 1
3 301.34 for
D D
t
D
t … T T …
D
t T
∀ = , , − , + , ,∞,⎧= ⎨ , =⎩ .
 
 
 Assuming the tax burden is distributed evenly across all individuals alive at time t, the 
required per capita lump sum tax rate (without debt) is 15,232.39/188,021 = 0.08101 per 
period.35  At time Dt T= , the government decreases the tax rate and instead borrows to 
finance some of its expenditures.   
 
 Assuming the benefits of the tax cut are shared equally, the per capita amount of the tax 
cut is 3 301.34 /188,021 0.01756τ∆ = , = .36  The debt and any accumulated interest are 
repaid in the following period.  Thus  
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A.2.  THE INTERGENERATIONAL DISCOUNT RATE  
Reliable estimates of ρ are difficult to find in the literature.  Some authors perform econometric 
analyses to test for the presence of intergenerational altruism but, even when they find evidence 
of it, seldom report the resulting intergenerational discount rate.37  This absence led Laitner 
(1993) to simply assume parents care as much about their children’s well-being as they do about 
their own and set ρ β=  in his analysis.  One estimate is provided by Kuehlwein (1993), using 
the Retirement History Survey data.  He estimates the ratio of the marginal utility of giving a 
bequest to the marginal utility of future consumption to be 1.2.  That is, individuals choose 
bequests so the marginal utility of giving the bequest is 20 percent greater than the discounted 
marginal utility of consumption, which translates to an intergenerational discount rate of 
1 2 0 368ρ β= / . = . .  
 
The source of parent-to-child bequest data I use for calibration of the intergenerational discount 
rate is the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID).  The PSID has collected information on 
inheritances received since 1988.  While data from recent years is not yet fully available, there is 
data for the years 1988 - 1993.  During that time there are 612 instances of inheritances received 
by individuals.  These inheritances range from under $10 to over $1,000,000 (1 case.)  After 
adjusting for inflation (to constant 2000 dollars) the average inheritance received per capita is 
$658.5, which translates to a per capita bequest of 0.01317 each period of the model.38  The 
average inheritance amount, when one is given, is $30,202.  
 
Extrapolating from the PSID data gives an average annual flow of parent-to-child bequests of 
over $50 billion.  This is not out of line with Avery and Rendall’s (1994) estimate of $39.4 
billion – which they observe is likely an underestimate.  
 
Table A1 gives calibration results for the different model specifications.39  The calibrated values 
give the economy a steady state GDP consistent with that of the U.S. over the last 20 years (one 
period in the model).40  Converting the per-20-year-period intergenerational discount rates from 
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Table A1 to annual discount rates gives 0.9020, 0.8785 and 0.8859 respectively for the three 
model specifications.   
 
Table A1:  Calibration Values for A and ρ 
 
Parameter Value 
Model Specification 
A ρ 
Non-Manipulative 2.3246 0.1272 
Simultaneous Choices 2.7710 0.0750 
Sequential Choices 2.8377 0.0886 
 
 
A.3.  OTHER PARAMETERS 
Capital’s share of income (α ) is chosen to be consistent with values used in other similar 
studies.  Kydland and Prescott (1988) calculate capital’s factor share for 1977, “a typical year” 
(p. 352), to be 36 percent.  Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989), in extending 
the overlapping generations model of Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) to include bequests, use a 
capital income share of 0.25.  For this study I choose an intermediate value of 0 3α = . .  
 
An appropriate value for the CES utility parameter γ  is not readily obtainable from the data.  Its 
value is chosen to be consistent with that used in related studies.  Kydland and Prescott (1988) 
use a value of  while Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Hagemann and Nicoletti (1989) use a value of 
 and Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987) use –3.  Since the model of Auerbach, Kotlikoff, 
Hagemann and Nicoletti is most similar to my model I choose a value of –2.  (The simulation 
results are relatively insensitive to the choice of γ.)  This corresponds to an intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution of 0.33.  
0 5− .
1 86− .
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Appendix B
Derivation of First Order Conditions
This appendix presents derivations of equations used in the computer simulations. These
equations are derived for the sequential choices model specification. Comments indicate how
the equations would need to be modified for the simultaneous choices and precommitment
specifications.
B.1 The Elderly Consumer
The elderly consumer at time t (born at time t− 2) chooses consumption, ct−23 ∈ R+, and a
bequest, Bt−2 ∈ R+, to solve the following problem:
max
Bt−2,ct−23
[
β2u(ct−23 ) + ρ
[(
βu(ct−12 ) + β
2u(ct−13 )
)
+ ρU t
]]
subject to
ct−23 +B
t−2 ≤ wt + at−22 (1 + rt)− τt
ct−12 + a
t−1
2 ≤ wt + at−11 (1 + rt) +Bt−2 − τt
and ct−23 , Bt−2 ≥ 0
where rt, wt, a
t−2
2 , a
t−1
1 , and τt are taken as given. (In the simultaneous choice and precom-
mitment specifications ct−12 and a
t−1
2 are also taken as given.)
The elderly consumer’s first order conditions are most easily evaluated by substituting the
budget constraints into his objective function, thereby eliminating the consumption terms,
and differentiating with respect to Bt−2. This obtains:
−β2u′(ct−23 ) + ρβu′(ct−12 )
∂ct−12
∂Bt−2
+ ρβ2u′(ct−13 )
∂ct−13
∂Bt−2
+ ρ2
∂U t
∂Bt−2
≤ 0.
30
We next want to determine ∂c
t−1
2
∂Bt−2 ,
∂ct−13
∂Bt−2 and
∂U t
∂Bt−2 . One possibility is to consider the effect
of Bt−2 on each savings term of the consumer born at time t− 1, as well as the effect on his
bequest choice. Similarly we would need to consider the effect of Bt−2 on the decisions of the
consumer born at time t and so on. Much easier is to apply the envelope theorem, realizing
these individuals maximize their choices subject to the choice of Bt−2. Then ∂c
t−1
2
∂Bt−2 = 1 and
∂ct−13
∂Bt−2 =
∂U t
∂Bt−2 = 0. This result is consistent with that of other authors (e.g., Altig and Davis
(1989), O’Connell and Zeldes (1993), and Caballe´ (1995)).
The elderly consumer’s first order condition now reduces to
ρu′(ct−12 )− βu′(ct−23 ) ≤ 0. (B.1)
Substituting in the respective budget constraints, using the CES utility functions, and rear-
ranging gives
Bt−2 ≥ ρ
σ(wt + a
t−2
2 (1 + rt)− τt)− βσ(wt − at−12 + at−11 (1 + rt)− τt)
ρσ + βσ
(B.2)
where σ = 11−γ .
Since consumers are identical, elderly consumers in each time period face a similar
bequest function – different only in the time sub- and superscripts.
The young consumer may use his parent’s bequest function when attempting to manipulate
the size of his parent’s bequest.
B.2 The Young Consumer
The young consumer, born at time t, chooses consumption, ct1 ∈ R+ and savings, at1 ∈ R,
to solve the following problem:
max
ct1,a
t
1
[
u(ct1) + βu(c
t
2) + β
2u(ct3) + ρU
t+1
]
subject to
ct1 + a
t
1 ≤ wt − τt
ct2 + a
t
2 ≤ wt+1 + at1(1 + rt+1) +Bt−1 − τt+1
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and ct1 ≥ 0
where wt, a
t−1
2 , τt, wt+1, rt+1, τt+1 and equation (B.2) are taken as given. (In precommitment
the young consumer also takes Bt−1 as given.)
The young consumer may use information about his parent’s resources (at−12 ) to attempt
to manipulate the bequest his parent will choose next period – hence the inclusion of equation
(B.2) as a constraint.
The young consumer’s first order order conditions are most easily determined by substi-
tuting the budget constraints into his objective function, thereby eliminating the consump-
tion amounts, and differentiating with respect to at1. Applications of the envelope theorem
give ∂c
t
3
∂at1
= 0 and ∂U
t+1
∂at1
= 0.
We then obtain the following result (equation (10) in the text):
−u′(ct1) + βu′(ct2)
[
1 + rt+1 +
∂Bt−1
∂at1
]
≤ 0.
Evaluate ∂B
t−1
∂at1
using equation (B.2), which gives
∂Bt−1
∂at1
=
−βσ(1 + rt+1)
ρσ + βσ
.
Using this result and the CES utility functions, we substitute in the appropriate budget
constraints and solve for at1. This gives
at1 ≥
(wt − τt)At + at2 − Bt−1 − wt+1 + τt+1
At + 1 + rt+1
(B.3)
where
At =
[
β(1 + rt+1)ρσ
ρσ + βσ
]σ
.
Note: For the precommitment specification a young consumer’s savings choice has no effect
on the parent’s bequest choice. Thus ∂B
t−1
∂at1
= 0 and
At =
[
(1 + rt+1)β
]σ
.
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Since consumers are identical, young consumers in each time period face a similar first
period savings function – different only in the time sub- and superscripts. The middle-aged
consumer may use his child’s first period savings function when seeking to minimize the
child’s manipulative behavior.
B.3 The Middle-Aged Consumer
The middle-aged consumer at time t (born at time t− 1) chooses consumption, ct−12 ∈ R+,
and savings, at−12 ∈ R, to solve the following problem:
max
at−12 ,c
t−1
2
[(
βu(ct−12 ) + β
2u(ct−13 )
)
+ ρU t
]
subject to
ct−12 + a
t−1
2 ≤ wt + at−11 (1 + rt) +Bt−2 − τt
ct−13 +B
t−1 ≤ wt+1 + at−12 (1 + rt+1)− τt+1
ct1 + a
t
1 ≤ wt − τt
and
ct−12 ≥ 0
where rt, wt, a
t−1
1 , B
t−2, τt, rt+1, wt+1, τt+1, and equations (B.2) and (B.3) are taken as given.
(In the simultaneous-choice and precommitment specifications ct1 and a
t
1 are also taken as
given.)
The middle-aged consumer’s first order conditions are most easily determined by substi-
tuting the budget constraints into his objective function, eliminating the consumption terms,
and differentiating with respect to at−12 . Remember, in the sequential choices specification
the choice of at−12 affects at1 and the choice of a
t
1 affects B
t−1.
We obtain the following first order condition:
−βu′(ct−12 ) + β2u′(ct−13 )
[
1 + rt+1 − ∂B
t−1
∂at−12
− ∂B
t−1
∂at1
∂at1
∂at−12
]
+ ρ
∂U t
∂at−12
≤ 0. (B.4)
Evaluation of the last term gives
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∂U t
∂at−12
= u′(ct1)
[
− ∂a
t
1
∂at−12
]
+ βu′(ct2)
[
(1 + rt+1)
∂at1
∂at−12
+
∂Bt−1
∂at−12
+
∂Bt−1
∂at1
∂at1
∂at−12
]
.
Consider the four terms on the right-hand side of this equation. The first, second and
fourth terms together equal zero by application of the envelope theorem (from the young
consumer’s first order condition.)
So equation (B.4) becomes
−βu′(ct−12 ) + β2u′(ct−13 )
[
(1 + rt+1)− ∂B
t−1
∂at−12
− ∂B
t−1
∂at1
∂at1
∂at−12
]
+ ρβu′(ct2)
∂Bt−1
∂at−12
≤ 0. (B.5)
Use the elderly consumer’s first order condition to apply the envelope theorem again. This
eliminates the third and fifth terms (of the five terms) of equation (B.5).
Now evaluate ∂B
t−1
∂at1
and ∂a
t
1
∂at−12
.
Note: at1 is not directly affected by a
t−1
2 ; instead the effect is through the parent’s bequest
choice Bt−1. So
∂at1
∂at−12
=
∂at1
∂Bt−1
∂Bt−1
∂at−12
.
Evaluate ∂B
t−1
∂at1
and ∂B
t−1
∂at−12
using equation (B.2) and evaluate ∂a
t
1
∂Bt−1 using equation (B.3).
Now equation (B.5) reduces to
−u′(ct−12 ) + βu′(ct−13 )Ft ≤ 0 (B.6)
where
Ft = 1 + rt+1 − ρ
σβσ(1 + rt+1)2
(ρσ + βσ)2(At + 1 + rt+1)
.
Note: For the simultaneous choices and precommitment specifications ∂a
t
1
∂at−12
= 0. (In these
specifications the middle-aged consumer takes his child’s current-period savings amount (at1)
as given when choosing a savings amount at−12 .) For these specifications we have
Ft = 1 + rt+1.
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Using the CES utility functions, substituting in from the budget constraints, and rearranging
equation (B.6) gives
at−12 ≥
βσF σt (wt + a
t−1
1 (1 + rt) +B
t−2 − τt) + Bt−1 − wt+1 + τt+1
(1 + rt+1) + βσF σt
. (B.7)
Thus we have three equations ((B.2), (B.3), and (B.7)) in three unknowns (Bt−2, at1,
and at−12 ) that must be satisfied each period.
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Econlit offers only 13 entries for “Ricardian Equivalence" in 2003, one of the lowest numbers since 1986.  Entries 
rose to 25 in 1992, fell for several years, then jumped to 26 in 1998.  There are only five entries for “Ricardian 
Equivalence" in 2004 as of this writing. 
 
2 Conway (1999) finds that workers respond in a “Ricardian" manner to changes in state fiscal policy variables, 
particularly when states rely heavily on income taxes.  However, a much more common result is illustrated by Evans 
(1993) (for example) which finds little evidence of Ricardian behavior in macro-level data.  See Barro (1989) and 
Seater (1993) for surveys of the conditions believed necessary for Ricardian equivalence and their respective 
significance.  Each also provides reviews of the micro and macroeconomic studies that test for empirical evidence of 
Ricardian equivalence. 
 
3 After running modest surpluses from 1998-2001, the total U.S. federal budget deficit soared to nearly 4 percent of 
GDP in 2004.  Several European countries, including Germany and France, have exceeded the EMU-required deficit 
limit for the last several years, which necessitated relaxing the penalties originally prescribed by the Maastrict 
Treaty. 
 
4 Estimates of the portion of wealth accumulated for bequests vary widely, but the extremes range from 80 percent 
(Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985) to 20 to 30 percent (Modigliani, 1988). 
 
5 One benefit of examining causes of crowding out is to design policies that encourage private savings.  For 
example, Batina (1999) illustrates the importance of incorporating potential saving-for-bequest motives to 
understanding the effects of shifting to a consumption tax. 
 
6 Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers (1985) suggest a desire for child-to-parent services (e.g. phone calls, frequent 
visits, etc.), rather than altruism, motivates parental transfers.  The true motivation for parent-to-child transfers 
remains an open question in economics and is not an issue addressed in this paper.  Bernheim (1991) offers 
additional discussion on this question.  Altruism receives substantial attention in the literature hence it is the 
motivation used in this paper. 
 
7 Others have also used versions of the Samaritan’s dilemma to examine the effects of government policies and 
intrafamily linkages.  For example, Futagami, Kamada, and Sato (2004) employs a similar version of the 
Samaritan’s dilemma in an examination of government transfer policies.  Lambrecht (2003) analyzes some of the 
dynamics of using the Samaritan’s dilemma to model intergenerational relationships.  Gale and Perozek (2001) 
incorporate the Samaritan’s dilemma into a two-period, parent-child model to examine a potential role for public 
parent-to-child transfers as a means of eliminating the child’s incentive to act manipulatively. 
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8 For example, Barro (1989) closes with the prediction that “the Ricardian approach will become the benchmark 
model for assessing fiscal policy.”(p.52) 
 
9 Lucas (1986) suggests distortionary taxes may be the primary source of deviations from Ricardian equivalence. 
(p.121) 
 
10 An illuminating empirical analysis by Kopczuk and Slemrod (2001) finds a slight negative relationship between 
estate tax rates and the size of reported estates.   The theoretical work in this area continues to be divided.  For 
example, Laitner (2001), in a detailed general-equilibrium analysis, finds that removing estate taxes will increase 
aggregate saving.  In contrast, using partial-equilibrium analysis, Gale and Perozek (2001) conclude imposing estate 
taxes can actually increase aggregate saving, a result that is examined further below. 
 
11 Table 4 in Cremer and Pestieau (2003) summarizes the changes expected in response to a variety of fiscal policies 
for altruism and other bequest motives. 
 
12 In a more general version of this model I allow inter vivos transfers in addition to end-of-life bequests.  Because 
strategic behavior leads consumers to squander resources when young, parents always do best by not giving an inter 
vivos transfer.  Thus prohibiting inter vivos transfers has no effect on the results of this analysis.  While this may 
conflict with observations of middle-aged parents providing support to young children such transfers are generally 
tied to particular uses (such as education) rather than available for general consumption.  Also, because one period 
in this model spans 20 years, inter vivos transfers made late in life are effectively combined with end-of-life 
bequests. 
 
13 The intergenerational discount rate indicates the weight put on the child’s utility in the parent’s utility function.  
For example, a value of 0.5 indicates the parent values his child’s utility only 50 percent as much as the parent 
values his own utility from consumption.  Then, in equilibrium, the parent seeks to equate his child’s marginal utility 
of consumption to twice his own marginal utility of consumption. 
 
14 Some authors have chosen a modification of this approach.  For example, Caballé (1995), Batina (1987), and 
Cremer and Pestieau (1993) each use a three-period overlapping generations model and assume a parent makes all of 
his child’s decisions for the child’s first period of life, thus effectively removing the child’s opportunity for 
manipulation. 
 
15 Parents may appear to commit to a bequest amount by writing a will.  In fact a parent is also free to subsequently 
change the will, and thus is not really committing to a bequest amount. 
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16 Kockerlakota (2001) finds no evidence that consumers have time-inconsistent preferences in his examination of 
asset prices. 
 
17 A third possibility exists in that the child could make her choices before the parent makes his choices.  I omit this 
case because it seems highly unlikely a parent considering a bequest would wait to make his savings decisions until 
the child made all of her pre-bequest decisions. 
 
18 By assumption we are interested only the case of positive bequests.  Then, since individuals can borrow or save 
and , all budget constraints and first order conditions are satisfied with equality. 
 
19 Appendix B gives a specific derivation of this function for the computer simulations. 
 
20 In the simultaneous-choice specification the young consumer chooses savings a  at the same time as the middle-
aged consumer chooses savings a .  Later, in the sequential-choice specification, the middle-aged consumer 
chooses savings before the young consumer acts so these functions will not be dependent on  in that 
specification. 
 
21 See Appendix B for details on the derivation of this result. 
 
22 An analogous result is presented by Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986).  They demonstrate that a wealth 
redistribution amongst voluntary contributors to a public good has no effect of the provision of the public good.  In 
my model the child’s utility is a pure public good – both parent and child enjoy the child’s utility non-rivalrously 
and without possibility of exclusion.  The change in the timing of lump sum taxes is a simple redistribution across 
generations. 
 
23 Altig and Davis (1989) uses a similar measure. 
 
24 I also calculate R values for the case of immediate debt repayment and for the case when debt is left outstanding 
indefinitely.  Not surprisingly, the values are significantly smaller when debt repayment is immediate. 
 
25 The “max” operators on the right hand side of the following expressions reflect the fact that consumers may 
borrow as well as save, but capital gains taxes are collected only on returns to savings. 
 
β26 The specific parameter ranges are as follows: A varies from 1 to 5;  varies from 0.25 to 0.65 (corresponding to 
annual rates of approximately 0.93 to 0.98); γ ρ varies from -0.5 to -4;  varies from 0.05 to 0.15; and the portion 
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of government expenditures financed with debt varies from 10 percent to 30 percent. 
 
27 These results differ from those obtained by Bernheim and Bagwell (1988) because they assume the tax an 
individual owes in a period to be independent of the person’s actions in the period, thereby eliminating the 
distortionary nature of the labor, capital, and inheritance taxes.  Note, however, that a person’s behavior may 
influence the taxes he pays in the future. 
 
28 Two other effects, the small tax increase required to pay interest on the debt and the future tax increase required to 
retire the debt, could also be included in this list.  However, the former has only modest effects and the latter only 
affects consumers a few periods before it occurs. 
 
29 As Kaplow (2001, 188) points out, “many transfers, including bequests, come out of savings derived from 
previous receipts.”  Kaplow continues by pointing out that bequests are merely a type of end-of-life consumption.  
Then, “A tax on a subset of [final-period] consumption can be viewed in part as a tax on [final-period] consumption 
and hence as a tax on savings.”  (Kaplow 2001, 188).  Thus we expect qualitative similarities between the effects of 
inheritance and capital gains taxation. 
 
30 When altruism is the motive for intergenerational transfers, a parent gains utility when his child’s utility increases, 
other things held constant.  The giving of a bequest is therefore equivalent to purchasing a good.  When the parent’s 
income increases he will both purchase more of his own consumption goods and give a larger bequest, effectively 
purchasing additional units of his child’s utility.  If the parent receives the additional income prior to the period in 
which the bequest is given he will save more in order to finance the larger bequest. 
 
31 Gale and Perozek (2001) use a partial equilibrium model with intergenerational altruism and strategic behavior 
similar to the type used in this paper.  They find that lowering estate tax rates causes bequests to increase but the 
larger bequest amounts may cause the child’s saving to decrease more than the parent’s saving increases, thereby 
causing a net decline in aggregate saving.  Unfortunately, their partial equilibrium framework fails to account for the 
persistence of larger bequests observed in this general equilibrium analysis.  In their model, the parent benefits from 
the tax decrease, but does not also receive the additional income from a larger bequest.  The child receives a larger 
bequest but, since the child has no child of her own to give a bequest to, she has only her own future consumption to 
motivate higher saving.  Absent these two reasons for savings increases, their analysis likely understates the true 
change in aggregate saving that occurs as a result of a temporary, debt-financed, tax decrease. 
 
32 2005 Economic Report of the President, Table B-34, p. 251. 
 
33 2005 Economic Report of the President, Table B-78, p. 303 and Table B-84, p. 309.  Annual numbers were 
adjusted using GDP deflator values from Table B-3, p. 212, of the same source. 
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34 ibid. 
 
35 The units here are billions of dollars per thousands of people per 20 years.  This is equivalent to an annual per 
capita figure of $4,051. 
 
36 This corresponds to an annual per capita tax cut of $878. 
 
37 See, for example, Laitner and Juster (1996) and McGarry and Schoeni (1994). 
 
38 Two things to be aware of with the inheritance data from the PSID: first, the PSID doesn’t discriminate between 
bequests given by parents from those given by others.  Respondents were asked in 1988 (if and) when their parents 
died, but this question was discontinued the following year.  Second, the IRS reported hundreds of bequests by 
parents to children in excess of $1 million in 1989.  The PSID apparently underreports transfers by higher-income 
decedents.  Since these two problems affect the bequest estimate in opposing directions there is reason to expect 
they are somewhat offsetting and that the estimate above is reasonably accurate. 
 
ρ39 The reader may notice that the intergenerational discount rate ( ) used in the example in the text is higher than 
that determined here via calibration.  This occurs because, for the example, government spending and taxes are set to 
zero.  In the calibration, first-period savings falls because of the taxes the young consumer must pay.  To 
compensate elderly consumers increase bequests to their middle-aged children.  Thus second period savings rises 
and bequests by subsequent generations rise further.  (These are the changes predicted by Ricardian equivalence.)  
Other parameters held constant, the steady-state bequest amount is considerably larger when taxes are included than 
when they are absent.  In order to produce positive bequest amounts in the example (particularly in the non-
manipulative specification), the intergenerational discount rate must be greater than the rates determined here. 
 
40 Total U.S. GDP from 1985-2004 was $164,036.6 billions of chained 2000 dollars.  Source: 2005 Economic 
Report of the President, Table B-2, p. 210. 
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